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Reection using the derivability conditions
Sean Matthews

Alex K. Simpson
y
Dedicated to the memory of Roberto Magari
Abstract
We extend arithmetic with a new predicate, Pr, giving axioms for Pr based on
rst-order versions of Lob's derivability conditions. We hoped that the addition of
a reection schema mentioning Pr would then give a non-conservative extension of
the original arithmetic theory. The paper investigates this possibility. It is shown
that, under special conditions, the extension is indeed non-conservative. However,
in general such extensions turn out to be conservative.
1 Introduction
In any recursively axiomatized theory of arithmetic, T , one can follow Godel's construc-
tion to obtain a `provability predicate', a 
1
-formula Bew
T
(x) such that Bew
T
(pAq) is
true if and only if T ` A, where pAq is the Godel number of the formula A. Moreover, if
T is suciently strong then Bew
T
satises the following predicate (or `uniform') versions
of Lob's derivability conditions [7]:
(D1) if T ` 8xA then T ` 8xBew
T
(pAhxiq);
(D2) T ` 8x(Bew
T
(p(A! B)hxiq)! (Bew
T
(pAhxiq)! Bew
T
(pBhxiq)));
(D3) T ` 8x(Bew
T
(pAhxiq)! Bew
T
(pBew
T
(pAhxiq)hxiq));
where we write pAhxiq for a term with a free variable x `disquoting' any occurrence of x
in A (see Section 2). Solovay, [9], showed that the original propositional versions of the
derivability conditions identify all the valid `modal' schematic properties of Bew
T
(the
other modal axiom, the formalization of Lob's theorem, is derivable from (D1){(D3)
using the diagonalization lemma). Although the rst-order derivability conditions above
do not capture all the valid rst-order schematic properties of Bew
T
(see [2]), they do
isolate a natural class of `modal' properties satised by Bew
T
.
All the aforementioned work treats the derivability conditions as descriptive in that
their purpose is to describe properties of the Bew predicate. In this paper we consider
them in an alternative prescriptive ro^le. We dene a language, L
0
, by adding a new unary
predicate symbol, Pr, to the original language L. Then we dene an L
0
-theory, T
0
, as

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the least theory containing T that is closed under the following analogues of (D1){(D3):
(C1) if T
0
` 8xA then T
0
` 8xPr(pAhxiq);
(C2) T
0
` 8x(Pr(p(A! B)hxiq)! Pr(pAhxiq)! Pr(pBhxiq));
(C3) T
0
` 8x(Pr(pAhxiq)! Pr(pPr(pAhxiq)hxiq));
where we assume that Godel numbering has been extended to L
0
. It is natural to ask
how much of the behaviour of Bew
T
0 is forced upon Pr by the satisfaction of (C1){(C3).
As remarked in Boolos and Jerey [1, p. 185], there are many `predicates' other
than Bew
T
that satisfy (D1){(D3); for example, the predicate expressing the property
of being (the Godel number of) a well-formed formula. Therefore it does not hold that
T
0
` 8x(Pr(x)! Bew
T
0(x)). We shall see below that the converse implication fails too.
However, it occurred to us to consider the eect of adjoining the following analogue
of the uniform reection schema to T
0
:
(R) 8x(Pr(pAhxiq)! A):
The question we were interested in was whether T
0
+ R is a non-conservative extension
of the original theory T .
The possibility that T
0
+R might not be conservative over T was initially plausible
for the following reason. There is an evident `intended' interpretation of T
0
in T under
which Pr is (modulo some mapping of Godel numbers) translated as Bew
T
. Although
this interpretation can be used to prove that T
0
is a conservative extension of T , it cannot
be used to show that T
0
+R is. Furthermore, no other translation of Pr can be used for
this purpose either (Theorem 1).
On the other hand, the same interpretation can be used to establish that any L-
formula entailed by T
0
+R is a theorem in the theory obtained by extending T with its
uniform reection schema:
(Rfn) 8x(Bew
T
(pAhxiq)! A):
By Godel's second incompleteness theorem, T
0
+ R is a non-conservative extension of
T . Our initial hope was that T
0
+ R might be a (necessarily conservative) extension of
T + Rfn.
This possibility would be of practical interest. If T
0
+R were an extension of T +Rfn,
then the denition of T
0
+ R would provide a feasible way of extending the reasoning
powers of T without having to go through the laborious construction of Godel's Bew
T
predicate (although admittedly the denition of T
0
+R does still require a Godel num-
bering of formulae). Unfortunately, it turns out that T
0
+R is always conservative over
T (Theorem 2). (This shows that, as claimed above, T
0
6` 8x(Bew
T
0(x) ! Pr(x)).)
Thus our construction of T
0
+ R does not give the general method of achieving a non-
conservative extension of T that we hoped for.
Nevertheless, a slight and natural modication of the construction of T
0
+ R does
lead to a non-conservative extension in one notable case. Since Pr(t) is intended to
mimic Bew
T
(t) it ought to be treated as a 
1
-formula. So if T supports induction over

1
-formulae then it is reasonable to include induction over atomic formulae of the form
Pr(t) in T
0
. In this case T
0
+ R provides full induction over formulae of L
0
, and thus
contains Peano Arithmetic (Theorem 3). So for any T containing 
1
-induction but not
full induction, a non-conservative extension can be obtained by our method.
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Unfortunately, the non-conservative eect does not extend beyond Peano Arithmetic.
Since Peano Arithmetic supports induction over arbitrary formulae of L it is natural
to allow induction over arbitrary formulae of L
0
in T
0
. However, even allowing such
induction, if T is Peano Arithmetic then T
0
+R is conservative over T (Theorem 4).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we give the technical background to
our work. In Section 3 we give a semantic proof that, in general, T
0
+R is conservative
over T . In Section 4 we consider extending induction to the new language, proving the
non-conservativity result for arithmetic with 
1
-induction and the conservativity result
for Peano Arithmetic. Finally, Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout the paper we work, for convenience, with the language, L, of Primitive
Recursive Arithmetic (PRA) [4]. Thus when we refer to Peano Arithmetic (PA) we mean
a denitional extension in L of the usual Peano Arithmetic (which is in the language of
elementary arithmetic). As in Section 1, L
0
is the language obtained by adding a new
unary predicate symbol, Pr, to L.
A Godel-numbering of L
0
is an injective mapping from L
0
into the natural numbers.
We assume some such mapping. We denote the number standing for a formula A of L
0
by pAq, and similarly for terms, etc. We assume that all the relevant operations and
predicates on formulae/terms are primitive recursive. In particular there is a primitive
recursive function sub(; ; ), such that for any formula A (or term t), and number n:
sub(pAq; pxq; n) = pA[n=x]q
where n is the numeral s
n
(0). We write pAhtiq as an abbreviation for sub(pAq; pxq; t).
The restriction of pq to L gives us also a Godel-numbering of L.
Let T be any consistent, recursively axiomatized theory in L extending PRA (thus
T supports quantier-free induction). Let Bew
T
(x) be Godel's provability predicate for
T . As T extends PRA, the formula Bew
T
does indeed satisfy the properties (D1){(D3)
of Section 1. Dene the L
0
-theory T
0
as in Section 1.
Proposition 1 T
0
is a conservative extension of T .
Proof. We dene a translation ()

from formulae of L
0
to formulae of L. By the
second recursion theorem, there is a number r such that (writing frg for the r-th partial
recursive function):
frg(pAq) = pA

q
where ()

commutes with connectives and quantiers and is dened on atomic formulae
by:
P (t
1
; : : : ; t
n
)

= P (t
1
; : : : ; t
n
) (where P 6= Pr)
Pr(t)

= 9y(T(r; t; y)^ Bew
T
(U(y)))
(here T and U are Kleene's primitive-recursive T predicate and result-extraction func-
tion). By denition frg is primitive recursive, so there is a function symbol, star, such
3
that, by the formalized recursion theorem and quantier-free induction:
(1) T ` 8x9y(T(r; x; y)^U(y) = star(x));
(2) T ` 8x(star(pAhxiq) = pA

hxiq):
We now show that for all L
0
-formulae A, if T
0
` A then T ` A

; which, since ()

is
the identity on L-formulae, establishes the desired conservativity result. The proof is a
straightforward induction on the closure conditions of T
0
:
(C1) Assume that T
0
` 8xA. By the induction hypothesis we have that T ` (8xA)

,
and therefore that T ` 8xA

. We need to show that T ` (8xPr(pAhxiq))

; i.e.,
that
T ` 8x9y(T(r; pAhxiq; y)^ Bew
T
(U(y))):
However, T ` 8xyzw (T(x; y; z) ^ T(x; y; w)) ! z = w. Therefore, by (1) and
(2), the above formula is equivalent to T ` 8xBew
T
(pA

hxiq). And this, in turn,
follows from (D1) and the fact that T ` 8xA

.
(C2) We have to show that
T ` (8x Pr(p(A! B)hxiq)! (Pr(pAhxiq)! Pr(pBhxiq)))

which, in the same way as (C1) above, reduces to
T ` 8x(Bew
T
(p(A! B)

hxiq)! Bew
T
(pA

hxiq)! Bew
T
(pB

hxiq));
an instance of (D2).
(C3) Similar to (C2) only making use of (D3) instead. 
Proposition 2 For any L-formula A, if T
0
+R ` A then T + Rfn ` A.
Proof. Let ()

be the translation from L
0
to L dened in the last proof. We already
know that if T
0
` A then T ` A

and hence T + Rfn ` A

. So we need only show that
T + Rfn ` R

. However, as in the proof above, this translates to showing that:
T + Rfn ` 8x(Bew
T
(pA

hxiq)! A

);
which is an instance of Rfn. 
The above translation cannot be used to prove the conservativity of T
0
+ R over T ,
because it is not in general the case that T ` 8x(Bew
T
(pA

hxiq) ! A

). One might
wonder whether there is a cleverer translation that works instead. We now give a quite
general proof that in fact there is none.
We consider a general notion of translation useful for proving conservativity. A
retraction of L
0
onto L is a function, ()
y
, from L
0
-formulae to L-formulae that: commutes
with connectives and quantiers; maps atomic formulae in L to themselves; and maps
Pr(t) to H(t), where H(x) is some xed L-formula. (It is a retraction in the appropriate
category of languages and translations.) Clearly ()
y
is determined by the choice of H(x).
Note that the translation, ()

, used in the above proofs is the retraction determined by
the formula 9y(T(r; x; y)^ Bew
T
(U(y))).
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Let S be any L-theory and S
0
be any L
0
-theory extending S. A retraction of S
0
onto S is a retraction, ()
y
, from L
0
to L such that, for any L
0
-formula A, it holds
that S
0
` A implies S ` A
y
. (It is a retraction in the appropriate category of theories
and interpretations.) It is clear that the existence of a retraction from S
0
to S implies
that S
0
is a conservative extension of S. Indeed the proof of Proposition 1 worked by
establishing that ()

is a retraction of T
0
onto T . The impossibility of obtaining a similar
translational proof of the conservativity of T
0
+R over T is given by:
Theorem 1 There is no retraction of T
0
+R onto T .
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that ()
y
is a retraction of T
0
+ R onto T in which
Pr is translated to H(x). By the diagonalization lemma, there is an L-sentence A such
that:
(3) T ` A$ :H(pAq):
However, we claim that:
(4) if T ` A then T ` H(pAq);
(5) T ` H(pAq)! A:
To see that (4) holds, suppose that T ` A. Then T
0
` A. So, by (C1), it follows that
T
0
` Pr(pAq). Therefore T ` (Pr(pAq))
y
. So T ` H(pAq) as required. For (5), we have
that T
0
+ R ` Pr(pAq)! A. So T ` (Pr(pAq)! A)
y
. Thus indeed T ` H(pAq)! A.
But from (3){(5) it is easy to derive that T is inconsistent | a contradiction. 
This proof is similar to Montague's proof of the inconsistency of giving syntactic inter-
pretations to certain modal logics [8].
3 The general conservativity proof
Theorem 1 gives hope that T
0
+R might be non-conservative over T . Unfortunately, this
turns out not to be the case. The main theorem of this section is:
Theorem 2 T
0
+R is a conservative extension of T .
The proof of the theorem involves some analysis of properties of Godel-numbering
when formalized in T . Recall that all the relevant operations and predicates on Godel-
numbers have been assumed to be primitive recursive. More specically, we require prim-
itive recursive `constructors' for all function symbols, predicate symbols, connectives and
quantiers, which can be used to assemble terms and formulas. As T supports quantier-
free induction, each constructor is provably injective. Furthermore it is provable in T
that the Godel-number of a compound term/formula has a unique decomposition into
the components out of which it is built. We also require a primitive recursive function
free-in(; ), such that free-in(pAq; pxq) if and only if x is free in A (and similarly for
terms). Again, quantier-free induction suces to ensure that:
(S1) T ` pA[s(x)=x]hyiq = pAhs(y)iq;
(S2) T ` :free-in(pAq; pxq)! pAhyiq = pAhziq;
(S3) T ` (free-in(pAq; pxq)^ pAhyiq = pAhziq)! y = z;
(S4) T ` (free-in(ptq; pxq) ^ ptq 6= pxq ^ y  z)! pxhyiq 6= pthziq:
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The meanings of (S1){(S3) are clear (and, of course, analogous properties hold for
substitution in terms). The more cumbersome (S4) reects the fact that if t is dierent
from, but contains, x and m  n, then m is dierent from t[n=x] (since the former is a
strict subterm of the latter).
Theorem 2 will be proved semantically. Let M = (D;; 0; s; : : :) be an arbitrary
model of T . We extend M to a L
0
-structure,M
0
, by dening, for d 2 D:
Pr(d) if there exists an L
0
-formula A and an element d
0
2 D such that
d = pAhd
0
iq and T
0
` 8xA.
We shall prove a sequence of results aiming to show thatM
0
is a model of T
0
+R.
First we make some useful observations. If x occurs free in A then, by (S3), the
function x 7! pAhxiq tends to innity. Moreover, for any n, there exists m such that
T ` 8x  m pAhxiq  n (by quantier free induction). Thus if d is any non-standard
element in D then the element pAhdiq is also non-standard. On the other hand, if x
does not occur free in A then, by (S2), pAhdiq is standard and equal to pAq.
Lemma 3 If d 2 D is non-standard, d  d
0
2 D and pAhdiq = pBhd
0
iq then there exists
n such that A is syntactically identical to B[s
n
(x)=x] (notation A  B[s
n
(x)=x]).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of B. Suppose that d 2 D is non-
standard and d  d
0
2 D.
We rst show, by induction on the structure of terms t, that if pt
0
hdiq = pthd
0
iq then:
1. if x does not occur free in t, then t
0
 t;
2. if x occurs free in t then there exists n such that d
0
= s
n
(d) and t
0
 t[s
n
(x)=x].
Suppose the term is a variable, y, dierent from x, and pt
0
hdiq = pyhd
0
iq. Now x is
not free in y so, by (S2), pyhd
0
iq = pyq and is standard. Thus pt
0
hdiq is standard, which
implies that x does not occur free in t
0
. So pt
0
hdiq = pt
0
q. Therefore, by the injectivity
of Godel numbering, t
0
 y as required.
Suppose the term is x and pt
0
hdiq = pxhd
0
iq. We prove, by induction on the structure
of t
0
, that there exists n such that d
0
= s
n
(d) and t
0
 s
n
(x). First, t
0
cannot be a
variable y dierent from x because then pt
0
hdiq would be standard whereas pxhd
0
iq is
non-standard. If t
0
is x then we are done with n = 0, as d = d
0
by (S3). Lastly, suppose
that t
0
is of the form f
0
(t
0
1
; : : : ; t
0
h
) (with h possibly zero). Now d
0
2 D is non-standard so
it has a predecessor d
00
2 D. Thus pxhd
0
iq = pxhs(d
00
)iq = ps(x)hd
00
iq, the last equality
by (S1). But then pt
0
hdiq = ps(x)hd
00
iq. So, by the formalized injectivity of Godel
numbering, t
0
is of the form s(t
00
) for some t
00
such that pt
00
hdiq = pxhd
00
iq. Then, by the
induction hypothesis, there exists n such that d
00
= s
n
(d) and t
00
 s
n
(x). Thus n+ 1 is
the number required as d
0
= s
n+1
(d) and t
0
 s
n+1
(x).
Suppose that the term is f(t
1
; : : : ; t
k
) (where k is possibly zero) and pt
0
hdiq =
pf(t
1
; : : : ; t
k
)hd
0
iq. Then t
0
cannot be a variable y dierent from x. If t
0
is x then x
must occur free in some t
i
(otherwise pf(t
1
; : : : ; t
k
)hd
0
iq would be standard). However,
d  d
0
so, by (S4), pxhdiq 6= pf(t
1
; : : : ; t
k
)hd
0
iq, a contradiction. So t
0
must be of the
form f
0
(t
0
1
; : : : ; t
0
h
). But then, by formalized injectivity, we have that f  f
0
. So h = k
and, for all i (1  i  k) pt
0
i
hdiq = pt
i
hd
0
iq. If x does not occur free in any t
i
then, by
the induction hypothesis, t
0
i
 t
i
for all i and thus t
0
 f(t
1
; : : : ; t
k
) as required. If x
6
does occur free in some t
i
then, by the induction hypothesis, there exists n such that
d
0
= s
n
(d) and, for all i, t
0
i
 t
i
[s
n
(x)=x]. So indeed t
0
 f(t
1
; : : : ; t
k
)[s
n
(x)=x].
It remains only to extend the induction to formulae. One proves, by induction on
the structure of B, that pAhdiq = pBhd
0
iq implies that if x does not occur free in B
then A  B and if x does occur free in B then there exists n such that d
0
= s
n
(d) and
A  B[s
n
(x)=x]. The straightforward argument, similar to the case for f
0
(t
0
1
; : : : ; t
0
h
) and
f(t
1
; : : : ; t
k
) above, is omitted. The result follows. .
Lemma 4
1. If d 2 D is standard then M
0
j= Pr(pAhdiq) if and only if T
0
` A[d=x].
2. If d 2 D is non-standard then M
0
j= Pr(pAhdiq) if and only if there exists n such
that T
0
` 8x(A[s
n
(x)=x]).
Proof.
1. Suppose d 2 D is standard and M
0
j= Pr(pAhdiq). Then pA[d=x]q = pAhdiq =
pBhd
0
iq for some d
0
2 D and B such that T
0
` 8xB (by the denition of the
extension of Pr in M
0
). Now if d
0
is standard then T
0
` B[d
0
=x] and pA[d=x]q =
pB[d
0
=x]q so A[d=x]  B[d
0
=x]. Thus indeed T
0
` A[d=x]. If, however, d
0
is non-
standard then x cannot occur free in B. Therefore T
0
` B and pA[d=x]q = pBq so
A[d=x]  B. Thus again T
0
` A[d=x] as required.
Conversely, suppose that T
0
` A[d=x]. Then trivially T
0
` 8xA[d=x]. It follows
thatM
0
j= Pr(pA[d=x]q). Thus indeed M
0
j= Pr(pAhdiq).
2. Suppose that d 2 D is non-standard, and thatM
0
j= Pr(pAhdiq). Then pAhdiq =
pBhd
0
iq for some d
0
2 D and B such that T
0
` 8xB. If d  d
0
then, by Lemma 3,
A  B[s
m
(x)=x] for some m. So clearly T
0
` 8xA, and the n we are required to
nd is zero. If d
0
< d and d
0
is non-standard then, by Lemma 3, A[s
n
(x)=x] B for
some n. But then we have found an n such that T
0
` 8xA[s
n
(x)=x]. Lastly, if d
0
is
standard then pBhd
0
iq is standard, so x cannot occur free in A. Thus A  B[d
0
=x])
and T
0
` B[d
0
=x]. Therefore T
0
` 8xA and again n is zero.
Conversely, suppose there exists n such that T
0
` 8xA[s
n
(x)=x]. As d is non-
standard, there exists d
0
2 D such that d = s
n
(d
0
). By the denition of the exten-
sion of Pr, M
0
j= Pr(pA[s
n
(x)=x]hd
0
iq). But, by (S1), pAhdiq = pA[s
n
(x)=x]hd
0
iq.
So indeed M
0
j= Pr(pAhdiq). 
Proposition 5 M
0
is a model of T
0
.
Proof. We must show thatM
0
validates (C1){(C3).
(C1) Suppose T
0
` 8xA and d 2 D. Then it is immediate from the denition of the
extension of Pr in M
0
thatM
0
j= Pr(pAhdiq) as required.
(C2) Suppose d 2 D, M
0
j= Pr(p(A! B)hdiq) and M
0
j= Pr(pAhdiq). If d is standard
then, by Lemma 4(1), T
0
` (A ! B)[d=x] and T
0
` A[d=x]. So T
0
` B[d=x]
whence, by Lemma 4(1),M
0
j= Pr(pBhdiq) as required. If d is non-standard then,
by Lemma 4(2), there exists m such that T
0
` 8x(A ! B)[s
m
(x)=x] and there
exists m
0
such that T
0
` 8xA[s
m
0
(x)=x]. Therefore T
0
` 8xB[s
n
(x)=x] where n is
the maximum of m and m
0
. So, by Lemma 4(2),M
0
j= Pr(pBhdiq) as required.
7
(C3) Suppose that d 2 D and M
0
j= Pr(pAhdiq). We omit the easy argument if d
is standard. If d is non-standard then, by Lemma 4(2), there exists n such that
T
0
` 8xA[s
n
(x)=x]. Whence, by (C1), T
0
` 8xPr(pA[s
n
(x)=x]hxiq). Now, by n
applications of (S1), T
0
` 8x(Pr(pAhs
n
(x)iq)). So, by Lemma 4(2), it follows that
M
0
j= Pr(pPr(pAhxiq)hdiq) as required. 
We now have a second proof of Proposition 1. We have shown that any model M of T
extends to a model M
0
of T
0
. It follows that T
0
is a conservative extension of T .
Proposition 6 M
0
is a model of T
0
+R.
Proof. We need only verify R. Suppose then that d 2 D and M
0
j= Pr(pAhdiq). If d is
standard then, by Lemma 4(1), T
0
` A[d=x]. Thus, by Proposition 5, M
0
j= A[d=x] as
required. If, however, d is non-standard then, by Lemma 4(2), there exists n such that
T
0
` 8x(A[s
n
(x)=x]). By Proposition 5, M
0
j= 8x(A[s
n
(x)=x]). But d is non-standard,
so there exists d
0
2 D such that d = s
n
(d
0
). ThereforeM
0
j= A[d=x] as required. 
We have shown that any model of T extends to a model of T
0
+ R. This completes the
proof of Theorem 2.
4 Extending induction to L
0
The conservativity result of the last section is very general, as the proof works for an
arbitrary T extending PRA. Nevertheless, one important possibility has been overlooked:
that of extending induction to the language L
0
. However, the rules of how one ought to do
this are not immediately clear. For example, if T is PRA then it only has induction over
quantier-free formulae. Given that we are thinking of Pr as a 
1
-formula in disguise,
it does not seem reasonable to give T
0
any instances of induction not already available
in PRA. Thus although uniform reection together with PRA gives PA, there is no
analogous result using T
0
and R.
The situation becomes a good deal more interesting if we consider PRA together
with 
1
-induction as the initial theory. We shall refer to this theory as I
1
.
With I
1
as the base theory it seems reasonable to give the extended theory induction
over some appropriate analogue of 
1
in L
0
. To this end, we extend the arithmetical
hierarchy to L
0
. We dene sets 
0
n
, 
0
n
(1  n) as the least sets closed under:
1. 
0
n
 
0
n+1
;
0
n+1
and 
0
n
 
0
n+1
;
0
n+1
2. If P is not Pr then P (t
1
; : : : ; t
n
) 2 
0
1
;
0
1
.
3. Pr(t) 2 
0
1
.
4. If A;B 2 
0
n
then A ^B; 9xA 2 
0
n
and :A 2 
0
n
.
5. If A;B 2 
0
n
then A ^B; 8xA 2 
0
n
and :A 2 
0
n
.
The motivation is that Pr is supposed to be emulating a 
1
(but not 
1
) formula.
We now give the extended theory, I
0
1
, the evident denition: I
0
1
is the smallest L
0
-
theory containing I
1
and 
0
1
-induction and closed under (C1){(C3). Again we consider
adding the analogue of uniform reection, R. This time we do get the desired non-
conservativity.
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Theorem 3 I
0
1
+ R contains PA.
Proof. Suppose that I
0
1
` A[0=x] and I
0
1
` 8x (A ! A[s(x)=x]). Applying (C1) we
get that I
0
1
` Pr(pA[0=x]q) and I
0
1
` 8xPr(p(A! A[s(x)=x])[x]q). The former gives
immediately:
I
0
1
` Pr(pAh0iq):
The latter gives, by (C2), I
0
1
` 8x(Pr(pAhxiq)! Pr(pA[s(x)=x]hxiq)) whence, by (S1):
I
0
1
` 8x(Pr(pAhxiq)! Pr(pAhs(x)iq)):
We can now apply 
0
1
-induction to derive I
0
1
` 8xPr(pAhxiq). Therefore, by one
application of R, we have that I
0
1
+R ` 8xA.
It is now easy to see that I
0
1
+ R derives induction for any L
0
-formula, B. Just
apply the above argument to the formula:
A  (B[0=x]^ 8y(B[y=x]! B[s(y)=x]))! B:
The result follows. 
It is a special case of Lemma 8 below that I
0
1
+R is actually conservative over PA.
The above argument can be translated back to give an elegant proof, using only (D1),
(D2) and (S1), that I
1
+ Rfn is a theory as strong as PA. Note that condition (C3)
was not needed in the proof. Also, R was used only as a rule. We conjecture that if
any of (C1), (C2) and R are weakened to their propositional versions then the resulting
extension of I
1
is conservative.
We conclude by showing that the trick used to prove Theorem 3 cannot be generalized
to derive stronger principles than full induction. Dene PA
0
to be the least L
0
-theory
containing PA and induction over every L
0
-formula and closed under (C1){(C3).
Theorem 4 PA
0
+R is a conservative extension of PA.
We write I
n
for the L-theory obtained by extending PRA with 
n
-induction. Fol-
lowing the denition of I
0
1
above, dene I
0
n
to be the least L
0
-theory containing PRA
and 
0
n
-induction and closed under (C1){(C3). The proof of Theorem 4 uses the obser-
vation that:
(6) PA
0
=
[
n
I
0
n
:
The inclusion
S
n
I
0
n
 PA
0
is obvious. For the converse, it is easy to show that
S
n
I
0
n
contains PRA, contains induction for arbitrary L
0
-formulae and is closed under (C1){
(C3). Thus
S
n
I
0
n
satises the closure conditions of PA
0
. Therefore it contains PA
0
.
Lemma 7 For all n, the theory I
0
n
is a conservative extension of I
n
.
Proof. Taking T to be I
n
, consider the translation ()

from L
0
-formulae to L-formulae
dened in the proof of Proposition 1. We claim that for all L
0
-formulae A, if I
0
n
` A
then I
n
` A

. The claim is shown by a straightforward modication of the proof of
Proposition 1. The only additional case is to show that if A is an instance of 
0
n
-induction
then I
n
` A

. But this holds because ()

maps 
0
n
-formulae to 
n
-formulae, so A

is
an instance of 
n
-induction. 
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Lemma 8 For all n, the theory I
0
n
+R is a conservative extension of PA.
Proof. By Theorem 3, I
0
n
+R contains PA. Let ()

be the translation used in the last
proof. We claim that I
0
n
+ R ` A implies PA ` A

. We already know that if I
0
n
` A
then I
n
` A

and hence PA ` A

. So we need only show that PA ` R

. However, as
in the proof of Proposition 2, this follows from the following fact about PA [6]:
for all n, PA ` 8x(Bew
I
n
(pAhxiq)! A): 
By (6), it is clear that PA
0
+R =
S
n
(I
0
n
+R). It follows from Lemma 8 that PA
0
+R
is indeed conservative over PA. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the potential of using the derivability conditions to
induce properties of a provability predicate without having to go to the eort of following
Godel's construction. In particular we have focused on the possibility of obtaining non-
conservative extensions using an extra axiom mimicking the uniform reection schema.
Unfortunately, our results have been mainly negative. Although we have obtained a
non-conservative extension in one notable case, the resulting theory, PA, can be obtained
much more easily just by giving the full induction schema. Nevertheless, we believe that
our results (both of non-conservativity and of conservativity) are interesting.
One natural question is whether a more general method of obtaining non-conservative
extensions could be obtained by using more powerful axioms than (C1){(C3). It is clear
that the proof of Theorem 4 is general enough to apply to any T
0
generated by a collection
of axioms based on arithmetically valid formulae of predicate provability logic (see [2]).
Nevertheless, the possibility remains that a more general method could be obtained by
going beyond the modal paradigm of provability logic (for example, by replacing (C2)
and (C3) with single axioms quantifying over the Godel numbers of formulae). We
believe it to be an interesting programme to investigate such generalizations.
There are other ways of adding a new predicate to the language to obtain non-
conservative extensions. For example, one can axiomatize the property of being a satis-
faction class as in the work of Robinson, Kotlarski and others (see [5, Ch. 15]). Also,
Feferman has obtained non-conservative extensions by axiomatizing a partial truth pre-
dicate [3]. It is unclear how such semantic approaches relate to the provability based
approach of this paper.
Acknowledgements
The rst author was supported in part by a BFT grant (no. ITR ITS 9103). The second
author was supported by an SERC studentship (no. 90311820) and by an EPSRC
postdoctoral fellowship. Both authors thank Alan Smaill for encouraging this work.
References
[1] George Boolos and Richard Jerey. Computability and Logic. Cambridge University
Press. Third edition, 1989.
10
[2] George Boolos The logic of provability. Cambridge University Press. 1994.
[3] Solomon Feferman. Reecting on incompleteness. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 56:1{
49, 1991.
[4] Jean-Yves Girard. Proof Theory and Logical Complexity, Volume 1. Studies in Proof
Theory. Bibliopolis, Naples, 1987.
[5] Richard Kaye. Models of Peano Arithmetic. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991.
[6] Georg Kreisel and Azriel Levy. Reection principles and their use for establish-
ing the complexity of axiomatic systems. Zeitshrift fur Mathematische Logic und
Grundlagen der Mathematik, 14:97{142, 1968.
[7] Martin Lob. Solution of a problem of Leon Henkin. Journal of Symbolic Logic,
20:115{118, 1955.
[8] Richard Montague. Syntactical treatment of modality, with corollaries on reexion
principles and nite axiomatizability. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 16:153-167, 1963.
Reprinted in Formal Philosophy, selected papers of Richard Montague. Richmond
Thomason, editor. Yale University Press, 1974.
[9] Robert Solovay. Provability interpretations of modal logic. Israel Journal of Math-
ematics, 25:287{304, 1976.
11
